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1 Introduction
Scientists have a pressing need to organize their experiments, their
data, their results, and their conclusions into a framework such that
this work is reusable, transferable, and comparable with the work of
other scientists. In this paper, we will discuss the ‘‘ontology log’’ or olog
as a possibility for such a framework. Ontology is the study of what
something is, i.e the nature of a given subject, and ologs are designed
to record the results of such a study. The structure of ologs is based on
a branch of mathematics called category theory. An olog is roughly a
category that models a given real-world situation.
The main advantages of authoring an olog rather than writing a
prose description of a subject are that
N an olog gives a precise formulation of a conceptual world-view,
N an olog can be formulaically converted into a database schema,
N an olog can be extended as new information is obtained,
N an olog written by one author can be easily and precisely
referenced by others,
N an olog can be input into a computer and ‘‘meaningfully
stored’’, and
N different ologs can be compared by functors, which in turn
generate automatic terminology translation systems.
The main disadvantage to using ologs over prose, aside from
taking more space on the page, is that writing a good olog demands
a clarity of thought that ordinary writing or conversation can more
easily elide. However, the contemplation required to write a good
olog about a subject may have unexpected benefits as well.
A category is a mathematical structure that appears much like a
directed graph: it consists of objects (often drawn as nodes or dots, but
here drawn as boxes) and arrows between them. The feature of
categories that distinguishes them from graphs is the ability to declare
an equivalence relation on the set of paths. A functor is a mapping
from one category to another that preserves the structure (i.e., the
nodes, the arrows, and the equivalences). If one views a category as a
kind of language (as we shall in this paper) then a functor would act as
a kind of translating dictionary between languages. There are many
good references on category theory, including [1], [2], [3], [4], [5],
and [6]; the first and second are suited for general audiences, the third
and fourth are suited for computer scientists, and the fifth and sixth
are suited for mathematicians (in each class the first reference is easier
than the second).
A basic olog, defined in Section 2, is a category in which the
objects and arrows have been labeled by English-language phrases
that indicate their intended meaning. The objects represent types
of things, the arrows represent functional relationships (also known
as aspects, attributes, or observables), and the commutative
diagrams represent facts. Figure 1 is a simple olog about an
amino acid called arginine ([7]).
ð1Þ
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e24274
The idea of representing information in a graph is not new. For
example the Resource Descriptive Framework (RDF) is a system
for doing just that [8]. The key difference between a category and
a graph is the consideration of paths, and that two paths from A to
B may be declared identical in a category. For example, we can
further declare that in Diagram (1), the diagram
commutes, i.e., that the two paths A? R are equivalent, which can
be translated as follows. Let A be a molecule of arginine. On the
one hand A, being an amino acid, has a side chain; on the other
hand A has an electrically-charged side-chain, which is of course a
side chain. We seem to have associated two side-chains to A, but in
fact they both refer to the same physical thing, the same side-
chain. Thus, the two paths A?R are deemed equivalent. The fact
that this equivalence may seem trivial is not an indictment of the
category idea but instead reinforces its importance – we must be
able to indicate obvious facts within a given situation because what
is obvious is the most essential.
While many situations can be modeled using basic ologs
(categories), we often need to encode more structure. For this we
will need so-called sketches. An olog will be defined as a finite
limit, finite colimit sketch (see [9]), meaning we have the ability to
encode objects (‘‘types’’), arrows (‘‘aspects’’), commutative dia-
grams (‘‘facts’’), as well as finite limits (‘‘layouts’’) and finite colimits
(‘‘groupings’’).
Throughout this paper, whenever we refer to ‘‘the author’’ of an
olog we are referring to the fictitious person who created it. We
will refer to ourselves, David Spivak and Robert Kent, as ‘‘we’’ so
as not to confuse things.
1.0.1 Warning. The author of an olog has a world-view,
some fragment of which is captured in the olog. When person A
examines the olog of person B, person A may or may not
‘‘agree with it.’’ For example, person B may have the following
olog
which associates to each marriage a man and a woman. Person A
may take the position that some marriages involve two men or two
women, and thus see B’s olog as ‘‘wrong.’’ Such disputes are not
‘‘problems’’ with either A’s olog or B’s olog, they are discrepancies
between world-views. Hence, throughout this paper, a reader R
may see a displayed olog and notice a discrepancy between R’s
world-view and our own, but R should not worry that this is a
problem. This is not to say that ologs need not follow rules, but
instead that the rules are enforced to ensure that an olog is
structurally sound, rather than that it ‘‘correctly reflects reality,’’
whatever that may mean.
1.1 Plan of this paper
In this paper, we will define ologs and give several examples. We
will state some rules of ‘‘good practice’’ which help one to author
ologs that are meaningful to others and easily extendable. We will
begin in Section 2 by laying out the basics: types as objects, aspects
as arrows, and facts as commutative diagrams. In Section 3, we
will explain how to attach ‘‘instance data’’ to an olog and hence
realize ologs as database schemas. In Section 4, we will discuss
meaningful constraints betweeen ologs that allow us to develop a
higher-dimensional web of information called an information
system, and we will discuss how the various parts of such a system
interact via information channels. In Sections 5 and 6, we will
extend the olog definition language to include ‘‘layouts’’ and
‘‘groupings’’, which make for more expressive ologs; we will also
describe two applications, one which explicates the computation of
the factorial function, and the other which defines a notion from
pure mathematics (that of pseudo-metric spaces). Finally, in
Section 7, we will discuss some possible directions for future
research.
For the remainder of the present section, we will explain how
ologs relate to existing ideas in the field of knowledge
representation.
1.2 The semantic advantage of ologs: modularity
The difference between ologs and prose is modularity: small
conceptual pieces can form large ideas, and these pieces work
best when they are reusable. The same phenomenon is true
throughout computer science and mathematics. In programming
languages, modularity brings not only vast efficiency to the
writing of programs but enables an ‘‘abstraction barrier’’ that
keeps the ideas clean. In mathematics, the most powerful results
are often simple lemmas that are reusable in a wide variety of
circumstances.
Web pages that consist of prose writing are often referred to as
information silos. The idea is that a silo is a ‘‘big tube of stuff’’ which
is not organized in any real way. Links between web pages provide
some structure, but such a link does not carry with it a precise
method to correlate the information within the two pages.
Similarly in science, one author may reference another paper,
but such a reference carries very little structure – it just points to a
silo.
Ologs can be connected with links which are much richer than
the link between two silos could possibly be. Individual concepts
and connections within one olog can be ‘‘functorially aligned’’
with concepts and connections in another. A functor creates a
precise connection between the work of one author and the work
of another so that the precise nature of the comparison is not left to
the reader’s imagination but explicitly specified. The ability to
incorporate mathematical precision into the sharing of ideas is a
central feature of ologs.
1.3 Relation to other models
There are many languages for knowledge representation (KR).
For example, there are database languages such as SQL, ontology
languages such as RDF and OWL, the language of Semantic Nets,
and others (see [10]). One may ask what makes the olog concept
different or better than the others.
The first response is that ologs are closely related to the above
ideas. Indeed, all of these KR models can be ‘‘categorified’’ (i.e.,
phrased in the language of category theory) and related by
functors, so that many of the ideas align and can be transferred
between the different systems. In fact, as we will make clear in
Section 3, ologs are almost identical to the categorical model of
databases presented in Spivak’s unpublished paper ‘‘Functorial
Data Migration’’ available online http://arxiv.org/abs/1009.
1166, hereafter abbreviated FDM.
However, ologs have advantages over many existing KR
models. The first advantage arises from the notion of commutative
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diagrams (which allow us to equate different paths through the
domain, see Section 2.3) and of limits and colimits (which allow
us to lay out and group things, see Sections 5 and 6). The
additional expressivity of ologs give them a certain semantic
clarity and interoperability that cannot be achieved with graphs
and networks in the usual sense. The second advantage arises
from the notion of olog morphisms, which allow the definition of
meaningful constraints between ologs. With this in hand, we can
integrate a set of similar ologs into a single information system,
and go on to define information fusion. This will be discussed
further Section 4.
In the remainder of this section we will provide a few more
details on the relationship between ologs and each of the above
KR models: databases, RDF/OWL, and semantic nets. The
reader who does not know or care much about other systems of
knowledge representation can skip to Section 2.
1.3.1 Ologs and Databases. A database is a system of tables,
each table of which consists of a header of columns and a set of
rows. A table represents a type of thing T , each column represents
an attribute of T , and each row represents an example of T . An
attribute is itself a ‘‘type of thing’’, so each column of a table points
to another table.
The relationship between ologs and databases is that every box
B in an olog represents a type of thing and every arrow B?X
emanating from B represents an attribute of B (whose results are of
type X ). Thus the boxes and arrows in an olog correspond to
tables and their columns in a database. The rows of each table in a
database will correspond to ‘‘instances’’ of each type in an olog.
Again, this will be made more clear in Section 3 or one can see
FDM.
The point is that every olog can serve as a database schema, and
the schemas represented by ologs range from simple (just objects
and arrows) to complex (including commutative diagrams,
products, sums, etc.). However, whereas database schemas are
often prescriptive (‘‘you must put your data into this format!’’),
ologs are usually descriptive (‘‘this is how I see things’’). One can
think of an olog as an interface between people and databases: an
olog is human readable, but it is also easily converted to a database
schema upon which powerful applications can be put to work. Of
course, if one is to use an olog as a database schema, it will become
prescriptive. However, since the intention of each object and
arrow is well-documented (as its label), schema evolution would be
straightforward. Moreover, the categorical structure of ologs
allows for functorial data migration by which one can transfer the
instance data from an older schema to the current one (see FDM).
1.3.2 Ologs and RDF/OWL. In FDM, the first author
explained how a categorical database can be converted into an
RDF triple store using the Grothendieck construction. The main
difference between a categorical database schema (or an olog) and
an RDF schema is that one cannot specify commutativity in an
RDF schema. Thus one cannot express things like ‘‘the woman
parent of a person x is the mother of x.’’ Without this expressivity,
it is hard to enforce much rigor, and thus RDF data tends to be too
loose for many applications.
OWL schemas, on the other hand, can express many more
constraints on classes and properties. We have not yet explored the
connection, nor compared the expressive power, of ologs and
OWL. However, they are significantly different systems, most
obviously in that OWL relies on logic where ologs rely on category
theory.
1.3.3 Semantic Nets. On the surface, ologs look the most
like semantic networks, or concept webs, but there are important
differences between the two notions. First, arrows in a semantic
network need not indicate functions; they can be relations. So
there could be an arrow a father has a child in a semantic
network, but not in an olog (see Section 2.2.3 for how the same
idea is expressible in an olog). There is a nice category of sets and
relations, often denoted Rel, but this category is harder to reason
about than is the ordinary category of sets and functions (often
denoted Set). Thus, as mentioned above, semantic networks are
categorifiable (using Rel), but this underlying formalism does not
appear to play a part in the study or use of semantic networks.
However, some attempt to integrate category theory and neural
nets has been made, see [11].
Moreover, commutative diagrams and other expressive abilities
held by ologs are not generally part of the semantic network
concept (see [12]). For these reasons, semantic networks tend to be
brittle: minor changes can have devastating effects. For example, if
two semantic networks are somehow synced up and then one is
changed, the linkage must be revised or may be altogether broken.
Such a disaster is often avoided if one uses categories: because
different paths can be equivalent, one can simply add new ideas
(types and aspects) without changing the semantic meaning of
what was already there. As Section 4.4 demonstates with an
extended example, conceptual graphs, which are a popular
formalism for semantics nets, can be linearized to ologs, thereby
gaining in precision and expressibility.
2 Types, aspects, and facts
In this section we will explain basic ologs, which involve types,
aspects, and facts. A basic olog is a category in which each object
and arrow has been labeled by text; throughout this paper we will
assume that text to be written in English.
The purpose of this section is to show how one can convert a
real-world situation into an olog. It is probably impossible to
explain this process precisely in words. Instead, we will explain
mainly by example. We will give ‘‘rules of good practice’’ that lead
to good ologs. While these rules are not strictly necessary, they
help to ensure that the olog is properly formulated. As the Dalai
Lama says, ‘‘Learn the rules so you know how to break them
properly.’’
2.1 Types
A type is an abstract concept, a distinction the author has made.
We represent each type as a box containing a singular indefinite noun
phrase. Each of the following four boxes is a type:
Each of the four boxes in (4) represents a type of thing, a whole
class of things, and the label on that box is what one should call
each example of that class. Thus a man does not represent a single
man, but the set of men, each example of which is called ‘‘a man’’.
Similarly, the bottom right-hand box in (4) represents an abstract
type of thing, which probably has more than a million examples,
but the label on the box indicates a common name for each such
example.
Typographical problems emerge when writing a text-box in a
line of text, e.g. the text-box seems out of place here, and
the more in-line text-boxes one has in a given paragraph, the
ð4Þ
Ologs: A Categorical Framework for KR
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e24274
worse it gets. To remedy this, we will denote types which occur in
a line of text with corner-symbols, e.g. we will write a man
instead of .
For experts, types in ologs are intentional, rather than
extensional – the label on a type describes its intention. The
extension of a type will be captured by instance data; see Section 3.
2.1.1 Types with compound structures. Many types have
compound structures; i.e., they are composed of smaller units.
Examples include
It is good practice to declare the variables in a ‘‘compound
type’’, as we did in the last two cases of (5). In other words, it is
preferable to replace the first box above with something like
so that the variables (m,w) are clear.
2.1.2 Rules of good practice. A type is presented as a text
box. The text in that box should
i. begin with the word ‘‘a’’ or ‘‘an’’;
ii. refer to a distinction made and recognizable by the author;
iii. refer to a distinction for which instances can be documented;
iv. not end in a punctuation mark;
v. declare all variables in a compound structure.
The first, second, and third rules ensure that the class of things
represented by each box appears to the author as a well-defined
set; see Section 3 for more details. The fourth and fifth rules
encourage good ‘‘readability’’ of arrows, as will be discussed next
in Section 2.2.
We will not always follow the rules of good practice throughout
this document. We think of these rules being followed ‘‘in the
background’’ but that we have ‘‘nicknamed’’ various boxes. So
Steve may stand as a nickname for a thing classified as Steve
and arg inine as a nickname for amolecule of arg inine .
2.2 Aspects
An aspect of a thing x is a way of viewing it, a particular way in
which x can be regarded or measured. For example, a woman
can be regarded as a person; hence ‘‘being a person’’ is an aspect
of a woman. A man has a height (say, taken in inches), so ‘‘having
a height (in inches)’’ is an aspect of a man. In an olog, an aspect
of A is represented by an arrow A?B, where B is the set of
possible ‘‘answers’’ or results of the measurement. For example
when observing the height of a man, the set of possible results is
the set of integers, or perhaps the set of integers between 20 and
120.
We will formalize the notion of aspect by saying that aspects are
functional relationships. (Note that in type theory, what we here
call aspects are called functions. Since our types are not fixed sets
(see Section 3), we preferred a term that was less formal, namely
‘‘aspects’’.) Suppose we wish to say that a thing classified as X has
an aspect f whose result set is Y . This means there is a functional
relationship called f between X and Y , which can be denoted
f : X?Y . We call X the domain of definition for the aspect f , and we
call Y the set of result values for f . For example, a man has a height
in inches whose result is an integer, and we could denote this by
h : M?Int. Here, M is the domain of definition for height and
Int is the set of result values.
A set may always be drawn as a blob with dots in it. If X and Y
are two sets, then a a function from X to Y , denoted f : X?Y can
be presented by drawing arrows from dots in blob X to dots in
blob Y . There are two rules:
i. each arrow must emanate from a dot in X and point to a dot in
Y ;
ii. each dot in X must have precisely one arrow emanating from
it.
Given an element x [ X , the arrow emanating from it points
to some element y [ Y , which we call the image of x under f and
denote f (x)~y.
Again, in an olog, an aspect of a thing X is drawn as a labeled
arrow pointing from X to a ‘‘set of result values.’’ Let us
concentrate briefly on the arrow in (7). The domain of definition is
the set of women (a set with perhaps 3 billion elements); the set of
result values is the set of persons (a set with perhaps 6 billion
elements). We can imagine drawing an arrow from each dot in the
‘‘woman’’ set to a unique dot in the ‘‘person’’ set. No woman
points to two different people, nor to zero people – each woman is
exactly one person – so the rules for a functional relationship are
satisfied. Let us now concentrate briefly on the arrow in (8). The
domain of definition is the set of men, the set of result values is the
set of integers f20,21,22, . . . ,119,120g. We can imagine drawing
an arrow from each dot in the ‘‘man’’ set to a single dot in the
‘‘integer’’ set. No man points to two different heights, nor can a
man have no height: each man has exactly one height. Note
however that two different men can point to the same height.
2.2.1 Invalid aspects. We tried above to clarify what it is
that makes an aspect ‘‘valid’’, namely that it must be a ‘‘functional
relationship.’’ In this subsection we will present two arrows which
on their face may appear to be aspects, but which on closer
inspection are not functional (and hence are not valid as aspects).
Consider the following two arrows:
A person may have no children or may have more than one
child, so the first arrow is invalid: it is not functional because it
does not satisfy rule (2) above. Similarly, if we drew an arrow from
each mechanical pencil to each piece of lead it uses, it would not
satisfy rule (2) above. Thus neither of these is a valid aspect.
Of course, in keeping with Warning 1.0.1, the above arrows
may not be wrong but simply reflect that the author has a strange
world-view or a strange vocabulary. Maybe the author believes
that every mechanical pencil uses exactly one piece of lead. If this
is so, then amechanical pencil uses a piece of lead is indeed a
valid aspect! Similarly, suppose the author meant to say that each
person was once a child, or that a person has an inner child. Since
every person has one and only one inner child (according to the
author), the map a person
has as inner child
a child is a valid aspect.
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We cannot fault the author for such a view, but note that we
have changed the name of the label to make its intention more
explicit.
2.2.2 Reading aspects and paths as English
phrases. Each arrow (aspect) X
f
Y can be read by first
reading the label on its source box (domain of definition) X , then
the label on the arrow f , and finally the label on its target box (set
of result values) Y . For example, the arrow
is read ‘‘a book has as first author a person’’, a valid English
sentence.
Sometimes the label on an arrow can be shortened or dropped
altogether if it is obvious from context. We will discuss this more in
Section 2.3 but here is a common example from the way we write
ologs.
Neither arrow is readable by the protocol given above (e.g. ‘‘a pair
(x,y) where x and y are integers x an integer’’ is not an English
sentence), and yet it is obvious what each map means. For
example, given the pair (8,11) which belongs in box A, application
of arrow x would yield 8 in box B. The label x can be thought of
as a nickname for the full name ‘‘yields, via the value of x,’’ and
similarly for y. We do not generally use the full name for fear that
the olog would become cluttered with text.
One can also read paths through an olog by inserting the word
‘‘which’’ after each intermediate box. For example the following
olog has two paths of length 3 (counting arrows in a chain):
The top path is read ‘‘a child is a person, which has as parents a
pair (w,m) where w is a woman and m is a man, which yields, via
the value of w, a woman.’’ The reader should read and understand
the content of the bottom path.
2.2.3 Converting non-functional relationships to
aspects. There are many relationships that are not
functional, and these cannot be considered aspects. Often the
word ‘‘has’’ indicates a relationship – sometimes it is functional
as in a person has a stomach , and sometimes it is not, as in
a father has a child . (Obviously, a father may have more than
one child.) A quick fix would be to replace the latter by
a father has a set of children . This is ok, but the relationship
between a child and a set of children then becomes an issue
to deal with later. There is another way to indicate such ‘‘non-
functional’’ relationships.
In mathematics, a relation between sets A1,A2, and so on
through An is defined to be a subset of the Cartesian product
R(A1|A2|   |An: ð12Þ
The set R represents those sequences (a1,a2, . . . ,an) that are so-
related. In an olog, we represent this as follows
For example,
Whereas A1|A2|A3 includes all possible triples (p,a,j) where
a is a person, p is a paper, and j is a journal, it is obvious that not
all such triples are found in R. Thus R represents a proper subset
of A1|A2|A3.
Rules of good practice 2.1.2. An aspect is presented as a labeled
arrow, pointing from a source box to a target box. The arrow text
should
i. begin with a verb;
ii. yield an English sentence, when the source-box text followed
by the arrow text followed by the target-box text is read;
iii. refer to a functional dependence: each instance of the source
type should give rise to a specific instance of the target type;
2.3 Facts
In this section we will discuss facts and their relationship to ‘‘path
equivalences.’’ It is such path equivalences, which exist in categories
but do not exist in graphs, that make category theory so powerful.
Given an olog, the author may want to declare that two paths
are equivalent. For example consider the two paths from A to C in
the olog
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We know as English speakers that a woman parent is called a
mother, so these two paths A?C should be equivalent. A more
mathematical way to say this is that the triangle in Olog (15)
commutes.
A commutative diagram is a graph with some declared path
equivalences. In the example above we concisely say ‘‘a woman
parent is equivalent to a mother.’’ We declare this by defining the
diagonal map in (15) to be the composition of the horizontal map and
the vertical map.
We generally prefer to indicate a commutative diagram by
drawing a check-mark,H, in the region bounded by the two paths,
as in Olog (15). Sometimes, however, one cannot do this
unambiguously on the 2-dimensional page. In such a case we
will indicate the commutative diagrams (fact) by writing an
equation. For example to say that the diagram
commutes, we could either draw a checkmark inside the square or
write the equation f ; g~h; i above it. Either way, it means that ‘‘f
then g’’ is equivalent to ‘‘h then i’’.
2.3.1 More complex facts. Recording real-world facts in an
olog can require some creativity. Whereas a fact like ‘‘the brother of
ones father is ones uncle’’ is recorded as a simple commutative
diagram, others are not so simple. We will try to show the range of
expressivity of commutative diagrams in the following two examples.
2.3.2 Example. How would one record a fact like ‘‘a truck
weighs more than a car’’? We suggest something like this:
where both top and bottom commute. This olog exemplifies the
fact that simple sentences sometimes contain large amounts of
information. While the long map may seem to suffice to convey
the idea ‘‘a truck weighs more than a car,’’ the path equivalences
(declared by check-marks) serve to ground the idea in more basic
types. These other types tend to be useful for other purposes, both
within the olog and when connecting it to others.
2.3.3 Specific facts at the olog level. Another fact one
might wish to record is that ‘‘John Doe’s weight is 150 lbs.’’ This is
established by declaring that the following diagram commutes:
If one only had the top line, it would be less obvious how to
connect its information with that of other ologs. (See Section 4 for
more on connecting different ologs).
Note that the top line in Diagram (18) might also be considered
as existing at the ‘‘data level’’ rather than at the ‘‘olog level.’’ In
other words, one could see John Doe as an ‘‘instance’’ of
a person , rather than as a type in and of itself, and similarly see
150 as an instance of a real number . This idea of an olog having
a ‘‘data level’’ is the subject of the Section 3.
2.3.4 Rules of good practice. A fact is the declaration that
two paths (having the same source and target) in an olog are
equivalent. Such a fact is either presented as a checkmark between
the two paths (if such a check-mark is unambiguous) or by an
equation. Every such equivalence should be declared; i.e., no fact
should be considered too obvious to declare.
3 Instances
The reader at this point hopefully sees an olog as a kind of
‘‘concept map,’’ and it is one, albeit a concept map with a formal
structure (implicitly coming from category theory) and specific
rules of good practice. In this section we will show that one can
also load an olog with data. Each type can be assigned a set of
instances, each aspect will map the instances of one type to
instances of the other, and each fact will equate two such
mappings. We give examples of these ideas in Section 3.1.
In Section 3.2, we will show that in fact every olog can also serve
as the layout for a database. In other words, given an olog one can
immediately generate a database schema, i.e., a system of tables, in any
reasonable data definition language such as that of SQL. The tables
in this database will be in one-to-one correspondence with the types
in the olog. The columns of a given table will be the aspects of the
corresponding type, i.e., the arrows whose source is that type.
Commutative diagrams in the olog will give constraints on the data.
In fact, this idea is the basic thesis in FDM, even though the word
olog does not appear in that paper. There it was explained that a
category C naturally can be viewed as a database schema and that a
functor I : C?Set, where Set is the category of sets, is a database
state. Since an olog is a drawing of a category, it is also a drawing of
a database schema. The current section is about the ‘‘states’’ of an
olog, i.e., the kinds of data that can be captured by it.
3.1 Instances of types, aspects, and facts
Recall from Section 2 that basic ologs consist of types, displayed
as boxes; aspects, displayed as arrows; and facts, displayed as
equations or check-marks. In this section we discuss the instances
of these three basic constructions. The rules of good practice
(2.1.1, 2.2.1, and 2.3.4) were specifically designed to simplify the
process of finding instances.
3.1.1 Instances of types. According to Rules 2.1.1, each box
in an olog contains text which should refer to a distinction
made and recognizable by the author for which
instances can be documented. For example if my olog
contains a box
then I must have some concept of when this situation occurs.
Every time I witness a new person-cat petting, I document it.
Whether this is done in my mind, in a ledger notebook, or on a
computer does not matter; however using a computer would
probably be the most self-explanatory. Imagine a computer
ð16Þ
ð17Þ
ð18Þ
ð19Þ
Ologs: A Categorical Framework for KR
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e24274
program in which one can create ologs. Clicking a text box in an
olog results in it ‘‘opening up’’ to show a list of documented
instances of that type. If one is reading the CBS news olog and
clicks on the box an episode of 60Minutes , he or she should see
a list of all episodes of the TV show ‘‘60 Minutes.’’ If we wish to
document a new person-cat petting incident we click on the box in
(19) and add this new instance.
3.1.2 Instances of aspects. According to Rules 2.2.1, each
arrow in an olog should be labeled with text that refers to a
functional relationship between the source box and the target box.
A functional relationship f : A?B between finite sets A and B can
always be written as a 2-column table: the first column is filled with
the instances of type A and the second column is filled with their f -
values, which are instances of type B.
For example, consider the aspect
We can document some instances of this relationship using the
following table
Clearly, this table of instances can be updated as more moons
are discovered by the author (be it by telescope, conversation, or
research).
The correspondence between the aspect in (20) and Table (21)
makes it clear that ologs can serve to hold data which exemplifies
the author’s world-view. In Section 3.2, we will show that ologs
(which have many aspects and facts) can serve as bona fide
database schemas.
3.1.3 Instances of facts. Recall the following olog:
and consider the following instances of the three aspects in it
When we declare that the diagram in (15) commutes (using the
check-mark), we are saying that for every instance of a person (of
which we have three: Cain, Abel, and Chelsey), the two paths to
awoman give the same answers. Indeed, for Cain the two paths
are:
i. Cain . (Eve, Adam) . Eve;
ii. Cain . Eve;
and these answers agree. If one changed any instance of the word
‘‘Eve’’ to the word ‘‘Steve’’ in one of the tables in (22), some pair of
paths would fail to agree. Thus the ‘‘fact’’ that the diagram in (15)
commutes ensures that there is some internal consistency between
the meaning of parents and the meaning of mother, and this
consistency must be born out at the instance level.
All of this will be formalized in Section 3.2.2.
3.2 The relationship between ologs and databases
Recall from Section 3.1.1 that we can imagine creating an olog
on a computer. The user creates boxes, arrows, and compositions,
hence creating a category C. Each text-box x in the olog can be
‘‘clicked’’ by the computer mouse, an action which allows the user
to ‘‘view the contents’’ of x. The result will be a set of things, which
we might call I(x) [ Set, whose elements are things of type x. So
clicking on the box aman one sees I( aman ), the set of
everything the author has documented as being a man. For each
aspect f : x?y of x, the user can see a function from the set I(x)
to I(y), perhaps as a 2-column table as in (22).
The type x may have many aspects, which we can put together
into a single multi-column table. Its columns are the aspects of x,
and its rows are the elements of I(x). Consider the following olog,
taken from FDM where it was presented as a database schema.
The type Employee has four aspects, namely manager (valued
in Employee ), works in (valued in department ), and first name
and last name (valued in string ). As a database, each type
together with its aspects form a multi-column table, as in the
following example.
3.2.1 Example. We can convert Olog (23) into a database
schema. Each box represents a table, each arrow out of a box
represents a column of that table. Here is an example state of that
database.
Note that every arrow f : x?y of Olog (23) is represented in
Database (24) as a column of table x, and that every cell in that
column can be found in the Id column of table y. For example,
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every cell in the ‘‘works in’’ column of table employee can be
found in the Id column of table department.
The point is that ologs can be drawn to represent a world-view
(as in Section 2), but they can also store data. Rules 1,2, and 3 in
2.1.1 align the construction of an olog with the ability to document
instances for each of its types.
3.2.2 Instance data as a set-valued functor. Let C be an
olog. Section 3 so far has described instances of types, aspects, and
facts and how all of these come together into a set of interconnected
tables. The assignment of a set of instances to each type and a
function to each aspect in C, such that the declared facts hold, is
called an assignment of instance data for C. More precisely, instance
data on C is a functor C?Set, as in Definition 3.2.3.
3.2.3 Definition. Let C be a category (olog) with underlying
graph jCj, and let Set denote the category of sets. An instance of C
(or an assignment of instance data for C) is a functor I : C?Set. That is,
it consists of
N a set I(x) for each object (type) x in C,
N a function I(f ) : I(x)?I(y) for each arrow (aspect) f : x?y in
C, and
N for each fact (path-equivalence or equation)
f1 ; f2 ;    ; fn~f ’1 ; f ’2 ;    ; f ’m
declared in C, an equality of functions
I(f1) ; I(f2) ;    ; I(fn)~I(f ’1) ; I(f ’2) ;    ; I(f ’m):
The symbol ‘;’ in paths denotes concatenation or formal
composition. If we let f~f1 ; f2 ;    ; fn and f ’~f ’1 ; f ’2 ;    ; f ’m
denote two paths, then we often write (f~f ’) : i?j to denote the
fact that these paths are equivalent.
4 Communication between ologs
The world is inherently heterogeneous. Different individuals in
the world naturally have different world-views – each individual
has its own perspective on the world. By an individual we mean
either an individual person acting on their own, a community
acting as a single entity, a software agent, etc. Later in this section
we will use the notion of a community acting as a distributed
collection of linked, yet independent, individuals. The conceptual
knowledge (information resources) of an individual represents its
world-view, and is encoded in an ontology log, or olog, containing
the concepts, relations, and observations that are important to that
individual. An olog is a formal specification of an individual’s
world-view in a language representing the concepts and
relationships used by that individual. In addition to the
formulation of an expressive language, a specification needs to
contain axioms (facts) that constrain the possible interpretations of
that language.
Since the ologs of different individuals are encoded in different
languages, the important need to merge disparate ologs into a
more general representation is difficult, time-consuming and
expensive. The solution is to develop appropriate communication
between individuals to allow interoperability of their ologs.
Communication can occur between individuals when there is
some commonality between their world-views. It is this common-
ality that allows one individual to benefit from the knowledge and
experience of another. In this section we will discuss how to
formulate these channels of communication, thereby describing a
generalized and practical technique for merging ologs.
The mathematical concept that makes it all work is that of a
functor. A functor is a mapping from one category to another that
preserves all the declared structure. Whereas in Definition 3.2.3
we defined a functor from an olog to Set, here we will be
discussing functors from one olog to another.
Suppose we have two ologs, C and D, that represent the world-
views of two individuals. A functor F : C?D is basically a way of
matching each type (box) of C to a type of D, and each aspect
(arrow) in C to an aspect (or path of aspects) in D. Once ologs are
aligned in this way, communication can occur: the two individuals
know what each other is talking about. In fact, mathematically we
can show that instance data held in C can be transformed (in
coherent ways) to instance data held in D, and vice versa (see
FDM). In simple terms, once individuals understand each other in
a certain domain (be it social, mathematical, etc.), they can
communicate their views about it.
While the basic idea is not hard, the details can be a bit
technical. This section is written in a more formal and logical style,
and is decidedly more difficult than the others. For this section
only, we assume the reader is familiar with the notion of fibered
categories, colimits in the category Cat of categories, etc. We
return to our more informal style in Section 5, where we discuss
how an individual can author a more expressive olog.
4.1 Categories and their presentations
We never defined categories in this paper, but we defined ologs
and said that the two notions amounted to the same thing. Thus,
we implied that a category consists of the following: a set of
objects, a set of arrows (each pointing from one object to
another), and a congruence relation on paths; a congruence
relation on paths is an equivalence relation on paths that respects
endpoints and is closed under composition from left and right (see
the axioms in 25). This differs from the standard definition of
categories (see [6]), which replaces our congruence relation with a
composition rule and associativity law (obtained by taking the
categorical quotient). One could say that an olog is a presentation
of a category by generators (objects and arrows) and relations
(path congruences). Any category can be resolved and presented
in such a way, which we will call a specification. Likewise any
functor can be resolved and presented as a morphism between
specifications. We take an agnostic approach to foundations here.
With the presentation form, we show how categories and functors
are definable in terms of sets and functions, indicating how
category theoretic concepts could be defined in terms of set
theory. However, we fully understand that Set, the category of
sets and functions, is but one example of a topos, indicating how
set theoretic concepts could be defined in terms of category
theory.
In fact, this presentation form for categories (and the analogous
one for functors) is preferable for our work on communication
between ologs, because it separates the strictly graphical part of an
olog (its types and aspects, regarded as the olog language) from the
propositional part (its facts, regarded as the olog formalism). This
presentation form is standard in the institutions [13] and
information flow [14] communities, since it separates the
mechanism of flow from the content of flow; in this case the
formal content. Our work here applies the general theories of
institutions and information flow to the sketch logical system Sk (in
its various manifestations) that underlies categories and functors,
demonstrating how this logical system can be used for knowledge
representation. Using the presentation forms for categories and
functors, we show how communication between individuals is
effected by the flow of information along channels.
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4.2 The architecture underlying information systems
We think of a community of people, businesses, etc. in terms of
the ologs of each individual participant together with the
information channels that connect them. These channels are
functors between ologs, which allow communication to occur. The
heterogeneity of multiple differing world-views connected through
such links can lead to a flexibility and robustness of interaction.
For example, heterogeneity allows for multiple schemas to be
employed in the design of database systems in particular, and
multiple languages to be employed in the design of knowledge
representation systems in general.
For any olog, consider the underlying graph of types and
aspects. We regard this graph as being the language of the olog,
with the facts of the olog being a subset of all the possible assertions
that one can make within this language (in the other direction,
Section 4.4 indicates how natural languages can be encoded into
ologs). Any two ologs with the same underlying graph of types and
aspects have the same language, and since the facts of each olog
are expressed in the same language, they can be ‘‘understood’’ by
each other without translation. As such, we think of the collection
of all ologs with the same language (underlying graph) as forming a
homogeneous context, with the ologs ordered in a specialization-
generalization hierarchy.
Whereas an olog represents (the world-view of) a single
individual, an information system (of ologs) represents a commu-
nity of separate, independent and distributed individuals. Here we
consider an information system to be a diagram of ologs of some
shape I; that is, a collection of ologs and constraints indexed by a
base category I. The parts of the system represent either the ologs
of the various individuals in the system or common grounds
needed for communication between the individuals. Each part of
the system specifies its world-view as facts expressed in terms of its
language. The system is heterogeneous, since each part has a
separate language for the expression of its world-view. The
morphisms between the parts are the alignment (constraint) links
defining the common grounds.
As will be made clear in a moment, there is an underlying
distributed system consisting of the language (underlying graph) for
each component part of the information system and a translation
(graph morphism) for each alignment link. We can think of this
distributed system as an underlying system of languages linked by
translating dictionaries. This distributed system determines an
information channel with core language (graph) and component
translation links (graph morphisms) along which the specifications
of each component part can flow to the core. We can think of this
core as a universal language for the whole system and the channel
as a translation mechanism from parts to whole. At the core, the
direct flow of the component specifications are joined together
(unioned) and allowed to interact through entailment. The result
of this interaction can then be distributed back to the component
parts, thereby allowing the separate parts of an information system
to interoperate.
In this section, we will make all this clear and rigorous. As
mentioned above, we will work with category presentations (here
called specifications) rather than categories. We will discuss the
homogeneous contexts called fibers in detail and give the axioms
of satisfaction. We will then discuss how morphisms between
graphs (the translating dictionaries between the ologs) allow for
direct and inverse information flow between these homogeneous
fiber contexts. Finally, we discuss specifications (also known as
theories) and the lattice of theories construction for ontologies.
In Section 4.3 we will discuss how the information in ologs can
be aligned by the use of common grounds. This alignment will
result in the creation of information systems, which are systems of
ologs connected together along functors. We will discuss how to
take the information contained in each olog of a heterogeneous
system and integrate it all into a single whole, called the fusion
olog. Finally we will discuss how the consequence of bringing all
this information together, and allowing it to interact, can be
transferred back to each part of the system (individual olog) as a set
of local facts entailed by remote ologs, allowing for a kind of
interoperability between ologs. In Section 4.4 we will discuss
conceptual graphs and their relationship to ologs.
4.2.1 Fibers. A graph G contains types as nodes and aspects
as edges. The graphs underlying an olog is considered its language.
Any category C has an underlying graph jCj. In particular, jSetj is
the graph underlying the category of sets and functions. Olog (12)
has an underlying graph containing the three types person ,
person-pair and woman and the three aspects ‘has a parent’,
‘woman’ and ‘has as mother’. Olog (17) has an underlying graph
containing the three types emploee , department , and string
and the six aspects ‘manager’, ‘works in’, ‘secretary’, ‘name’, ‘first
name’ and ‘last name’. Let eqn(G) denote the set of all facts
(equations) that are possible to express using the types and aspects
of G. A G-specification is a set E(eqn(G) consisting of some of
the facts expressible in G. The singleton set with the one fact that
‘‘the female parent of a person is his/her mother’’ is a specification
for the graph of Olog (12). The set with the two facts that ‘‘the
manager has the same department as any employee’’ and ‘‘the
secretary of a department is an employee in that department’’ is a
specification for the graph of Olog (17). Let spec(G) denote the
collection of all G-specifications ordered by inclusion E1(E2.
4.2.2 Satisfaction. It will be useful here to define an instance
of a graph G, instead of an instance of a category C. An instance of
a graph populates the graph by assigning instance data to it. An
instance of a graph G is a graph morphism D : G?jSetj mapping
each type x in G to a set D(x) of instances and mapping each
aspect e : x?y in G to an instance function D(e) : D(x)?D(y).
Using database terminology, we also call D a key diagram, since it
gives the set of row identifiers (primary keys) of tables and the cell
contents defined by key maps.
A key diagram D : G?jSetj satisfies (is a model of) a G-fact
E [ eqn(G) (see Definition 3.2.3), symbolized DGE, when we have
an equality of functions D(E0)~D(E1). We also say that E (holds
in) is true when interpreted in D. An identity (f~Gf ) : i?j holds
in all key diagrams (hence, is a tautology), and vice-versa for any
set A [ jSetj a constant key diagram D(A) : G?jSetj satisfies any
fact E [ eqn(G). A key diagram D : G?jSetj satisfies (is a model
of) a G-specification E, symbolized DGE, when it satisfies every
fact in the specification. For any graph G, a G-specification E
entails a G-fact E, denoted by E‘GE, when any model of the
specification satisfies the fact. The consequence E. of a G-
specification E is the set of all entailed equations. The
consequence operator ({). is a closure operator, and the
consequence of a specification is a congruence. For any G-
specification E, entailment satisfies the follow axioms.
These are converted to inference rules in Table 1. To construct
E., we first take the reflexive, symmetric, and transitive closure E
of E (so that E is a G-specification and also the smallest
equivalence relation containing E), and then we get E. by closing
up under composition on left and right. We extend specification
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inclusion with the entailment order, where E1ƒGE2 when E1
entails each equation in E2; that is, when E
.
1)E2 or equivalently
when E.1)E
.
2 . The statement ‘‘E1ƒGE2’’ asserts that E1 is at least
as specialized as E2. The entailment order Sspec(G),ƒGT, which
is a specialization-generalization order, represents a local version
of the ‘‘lattice of theories’’ construction of Sowa [15] (see Section
4.2.5). The opposite entailment order f br(G)~Sspec(G),§GT is
called the fiber order. For consistency in discussion, we follow the
terminology of formal concept analysis [16], information flow [14]
and the theory of institutions [13]. This includes the polarity
induced by concept lattices and the directionality of infomorph-
isms. In the lattice spec(G) (this is a complete preorder, loosely
called a ‘‘lattice’’), the meet is union ^~| and the join is
intersection _~\; whereas in the lattice f br(G), the join is union
_~| and the meet is intersection ^~\. Any specification E is
entailment equivalent to its consequence E%E.. A specification E
is closed when it is equal to its consequence E~E.. There is a
one-one correspondence between closed G-specifications and
categories over graph G. The conceptual intent of a key diagram
D, implicit in satisfaction, is the closed specification int(D)
consisting of all facts satisfied by the key diagram. Hence, DGE
iff E(int(D) iff int(D)ƒGE. This equivalence between satisfac-
tion and entailment order is the first step in the algebraization of
Tarski’s ‘‘semantic definition of truth’’.
4.2.3 Elementary flow. A graphmorphismH : G1?G2 maps
the types and aspects of G1 to the types and aspects of G2. Graph
morphisms are the translations between ologs. A functor F : C1?C2
has an underlying graph morphism jF j : jC1j?jC2j. For any graph
morphism H : G1?G2, there is a fact function eqn(H) :
eqn(G1)?eqn(G2) that maps a G1-equation (f1~G1 f ’1) : i1?j1 to
the G2-equation (H
(f1)~G2H
(f ’1)) : H(i1)?H(j1), and a key
diagram functor dgm(H) : dgm(G2)?dgm(G1) that maps a key
diagram D2 : G2?jSetj to the key diagram H0D2 : G2?jSetj (the
composition of graph morphisms is written in diagrammatic order). At
the abstraction of institutions [17], the fact function is the fundamental
unit of information (formal) flow for ologs, and the key diagram functor
is the fundamental unit of semantic flow for ologs. Formal flow is
adjoint to semantic flow – satisfaction is invariant under flow:
dgm(H)(D2)G1E1 iff D2G2eqn(H)(E1) for any graph morphism
H : G1?G2, source fact E1 and target diagramD2. Specifications can
be moved along graph morphisms by extending the fact (equation)
function. For any graph morphism H : G1?G2, define the direct
flow operator dir(H)~2eqn(H) : spec(G1)?spec(G2) to be the
direct image function, and the inverse flow operator inv(H)
~eqn(H){1(({).) : spec(G2)?spec(G1) to be the composition
of the specification consequence operator followed by the inverse
image function. Direct and inverse flow are adjoint monotonic
functions Sdir(H) a inv(H)T : f br(G1)?f br(G2) w.r.t. fiber order:
dir(H)(E1)§G2E2 iff E1§G1 inv(H)(E2). For any graphmorphism
H : G1?G2, any G1-specification E1, and any G2-specification E2,
entailment satisfies the following axioms.
These are converted to inference rules in Table 1. A graph
morphism H : G1?G2 defines a consequence operator
({ )%H~dir(H)0inv(H) on the fiber preorder f br(G1), where
E1§G1E.1§G1E
%H
1 .
4.2.4 Specifications. A specification S~SG,ET is an indexed
notion consisting of a graph G and a G-specification E [ spec(G). It
is sometimes convenient to use the symbol ‘S’ in place of ‘E’; for
example, to say that ‘‘S [ spec(G)’’. A category C can be resolved
and presented as a specification spec(C)~SG,ET consisting of the
underlying graph G~jCj containing the types and aspects of C and
the collection E of all facts that hold in C. In the other direction, any
specification S induces a (quotient) category cat(S). Olog (12) and
Olog (17) are described as specifications in Section 4.2.1. A
specification morphism H : SG1,E1T?SG2,E2T is a graph
morphism H : G1?G2 that preserves entailment: E1‘G1E1 implies
E2‘G2eqn(H)(E1) for any E1 [ eqn(G1); or equivalently that satisfies
the adjointness conditions, dir(H)(E1)§G2E2 iff E1§G1 inv(H)
(E2). Being a graph morphism, it maps types to types and aspects
to aspects. Moreover, it also maps facts in E1 to facts in E2; that
is, it preserves all the declared structure. A functor F : C1?C2
can be resolved and presented as a specification morphism F :
spec(C1)?spec(C2). Hence, the presentation form for a functor does
exactly what the functor does. The fibered category of specifications
Spec has specifications as objects and specification morphisms as
morphisms. Thus, it is defined in terms of information flow. There is
an underlying graph functor gph : Spec?Gph from specifications to
graphs SG,ET.G. The subcategory over any fixed graph G is the
fiber f br(G); because of the opposite orientation, we say that ‘‘the
category of specifications points downward in the concept lattice’’.
Throughout this section we identify ologs with specifications and olog
morphisms with specification morphisms.
4.2.5 The lattice of theories construction. Sowa’s ‘‘lattice
of theories’’ construction (LOT) describes a modular framework
for ontologies [15]. The Olog formalism follows the approach to
LOT described in [18], where the IFF term ‘theory’ is replaced by
the Olog term ‘specification’ or ‘olog’. In the Olog formalism,
LOT is locally represented by the entailment preorders spec(G),
and globally represented by the category of specifications Spec.
We follow the discussion in Section 6.5 ‘‘Theories, Models and the
World’’ of Sowa [15]. From each olog (specification) in the ‘‘lattice
of theories’’, the entailment ordering defines paths to the more
generalized ologs above and the more specialized ologs below.
Sowa defines four ways for moving along paths from one olog to
another: contraction, expansion, revision and analogy.
Contraction: Any olog can be contracted or reduced to a
smaller, simpler olog, moving upward in the preorder spec(G), by
deleting one or more facts.
Expansion: Any olog can be expanded, moving downward in
the preorder spec(G), by adding one or more facts.
Table 1. Inference Rules.
equivalence: (reflexive)
(f~Gf ) : i?j
(symmetric) (f1~Gf2) : i?j
(f2~Gf1) : i?j
(transitive) (f1~Gf2) : i?j, (f2~Gf3) : i?j
(f1~Gf3) : i?j
algebra: (compositional) (f1~Gf2) : i?j, (g1~Gg2) : j?k
(f1 ; g1~Gf2 ; g2) : i?k
(bi-closed) (g1~Gg2) : j?k
(f ; g1~Gf ; g2) : i?k, (g1 ; h~Gg2 ; h) : j?l
morphic
flow:
(direct) (f1~G1 f ’1) : i1?j1
(H(f1)~G2H
(f ’1)) : H(i1)?H(j1)
(inverse) (H(f1)~G2H
(f ’1)) : H(i1)?H(j1)
(f1~G1 f ’1) : i1?j1
system
flow:
(direct) (f~Gn f ’) : i?j
(in(f )~G^i

n(f ’)) : in(i)?in(j)
(inverse) (in(f )~G^i

n(f ’)) : in(i)?in(j)
(f~Gn f ’) : i?j
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024274.t006
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Revision: A revision step is composite, moving crosswise in the
preorder spec(G); it uses a contraction step to discard irrelevant
details, followed by an expansion step to added new facts.
Analogy: Unlike contraction and expansion, which move to
nearby ologs in an entailment preorder spec(G), analogy moves to
an olog in a remote entailment preorder in the category Spec via
the flow along an underlying graph morphism H : G1?G2 by
systematically renaming the types and aspects that appear in the
facts: any olog E1 in spec(G1) is moved (by systematic renaming)
to the olog dir(H)(E1) in spec(G2).
According to Sowa, the various methods used in nonmonotonic
logic and the operators for belief revision correspond to movement
through the lattice of theories.
4.3 Alignment and integration of information systems
4.3.1 Common ground. Roughly speaking, an olog
morphism F : C?D is meaningful when for each type X in C,
every intended instance of X in C would be considered an
instance of F (X ) by the author of D (in which case we say the
intention for types is respected), and in a similar way the intention
for aspects is respected. Precisely speaking, if I : C?Set and
J : D?Set are instance data for C and D, then F is meaningful
relative to I and J if one can exhibit a natural transformation
m : I[F0J as in FDM.
Given the world-views of two individuals, as represented by ologs
S1~SG1,E1T and S2~SG2,E2T, there is little hope that one of
them completely contains the other (even after allowing for
renaming of types and aspects), and there is correspondingly little
chance of finding a meaningful olog morphism between the two.
Instead, in order to communicate the two individuals could attempt
to find a common ground, a third olog S~SG,ET and meaningful
morphisms H1 : S?S1 and H2 : S?S2 (a common ground olog
is also called a reference ontology in knowledge represen-
tation). This connection is a 1-dimensional knowledge network
S1 H1 S H2 S2 of shape ./.?. called a span (in Spec), where
each node is an olog and each edge is a morphism between ologs.
The requirements of this span are that dir(H1)(E)§G1E1 and
dir(H2)(E)§G2E2, two requirements involving local flow. Equiv-
alently, that E§Ginv(H1)(E1)_Ginv(H2)(E2). The latter precise
expression can be rendered in natural language as ‘‘the world-view
of the common ground is contained in the combined world-views
of the two individuals’’. The various local direct/inverse flows
allow world-views to be compared. Such a common ground can be
expanded and improved over time. The basic idea is that one
individual can attempt to explain a new idea (type, aspect or fact) to
another in terms of the common ground. Then the other individual
can either interpret this idea as they already have, learn from it (i.e.,
freely add it to their olog), or reject it. At the abstraction of
institutions [17], an olog morphism H1 : S1?S2 is an atomic
constraint (alignment) link between S1 and S2. Following this, we
view a common ground span S1 H1 S H2 S2 as a molecular
constraint between S1 and S2, which is weakest when S~1 and
strongest when S1~S~S2.
4.3.2 Systems of ologs. In the general case, more than two
individuals will share a common ground. For example, companies
that do business together may have a common-ground olog as
part of a legal contract; or, the various participants at a
conference will have some common understanding of the topic
of that conference. In fact, for any finite set of ologs
X~fS1,S2, . . . ,Sng, there should be a common ground world-
view (even if empty), say SX. If Y(X is a subset, then there
should be a map SX?SY because any common understanding
held by the individuals in X is held by the individuals in Y. For
example, the triangular-shaped diagram
represents three individuals f1,2,3g, their ologs fS1,S2,S3g, their
pair-wise common ground ologs fS12,S13,S23g, and their three-way
commonality olog S123. This diagram, which stands for the interaction
between individuals f1,2,3g, does not stand alone, but is part of an
intricate web of other ologs and alignment constraints. In particular,
individuals 1 and 3may be part of some different interacting group, say
of individuals f1,3,6,7g, and hence the right edge of the diagram
would be part of some tetrahedron-shaped diagram with vertices
f1,3,6,7g. If we take the point-of-view that ‘‘a collection of ologs
representing the world-views of various individuals’’ is a system, then
we can think of the ologs as being the types of that system, the
morphisms connecting the ologs as being the aspects of that system,
with the shape of a system being its underlying graph. In essence, we
can apply ologs to themselves. In the system represented by diagram
(26), there are seven types fS1,S2,S3,S12,S13,S23,S123g and nine
aspects f   ,S123?S13, . . .g, and the shape is the graph in the
diagram (27).
In addition, we can introduce certain facts to represent the
meaning of that system and then enforce those facts.
A distributed system is a diagram (functor) G : I?Gph of shape I
within the ambient category Gph. As such, it consists of an indexed
family fGnjn [ Ig of graphs together with an indexed family
fGe : Gn?Gmj(e : n?m) [ Ig of graph morphisms. Let Dist(I)
denote the collection of distributed systems of shape I. An
information system is a diagram S : I?Spec of shape I within the
ambient category Spec. As such, it consists of an indexed family
fSn~SGn,EnTjn [ Ig of ologs together with an indexed family
fSe : Sn?Smj(e : n?m) [ Ig of olog morphisms. Some of these
ologs might represent the world-views of various individuals,
whereas others could be common grounds; also included might be
portals between individual ologs and common grounds, as in the
CG example of Section 4.4. Let Info(I) denote the collection of
information systems of shape I. An information system S with
component ologs Sn~SGn,EnT has an underlying distributed
system G of the same shape with component graphs Gn for n [ I.
For any distributed system G, let inf oI(G) denote the collection of
information systems over G of shape I. There is a pointwise
entailment order SƒIGS0 on inf oI(G) when component ologs
satisfy the same entailment ordering EnƒGnE’n for n [ I, and by
taking the coproduct there is a pointwise entailment order on
Info(I)~
‘
G [ Dist(I) inf oI(G). A constant distributed system
D(G) [ Dist(I) is a distributed system D(G) : I?Gph with the
same language G for any index n [ I. Any constant distributed
system defines join and meet monotonic functions
_IG ,^IG : inf oI(D(G))?f br(G) mapping an information system
S [ inf oI(D(G)) to the join and meet ologs _S~
S
n [ I En and
^S~
T
n [ I En in f br(G). The join monotonic function is adjoint
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to the constant monotonic function DIG : f br(G)?inf oI(D(G))
that distributes an olog S0 [ f br(G) to the various locations n [ I
forming a constant information system D(S0) [ inf oI(D(G)), since
_S§GS0 iff S§ID(G)D(S0) for any system S [ inf oI(D(G)) and
any olog S0 [ f br(G).
4.3.3 System morphisms. Just as ologs are linked by
morphisms, information systems are also linked by morphisms. For
these there is the new complication of shape. In this paper we define
fixed-shape system moorphisms, but a more general definition would
allow the shape to vary. A distributed system morphism h : G[G0 in
Dist(I) consists of a collection fhn : Gn?G’njn [ Ig of component
graph morphisms, which are systematically coordinated in the sense
that they satisfy the naturality conditions Ge0hm~hn0G’e for any
indexing link e : n?m in I. A direct flow operator
dirI(h) : inf oI(G)?inf oI(G0) along h can be define, which maps
an information system S [ inf oI(G) to an information system
dirI(h)(S) [ inf oI(G0) defined by dirI(h)(S)n~dir(hn)(En) for
n [ I. This is well-defined, since dir(G’e)(dir(hn)(En))~dir(hm)
(dir(Ge)(En))§mdir(hm)(Em). An inverse flow operator invI(h) :
inf oI(G0)?inf oI(G) can similarly be defined. Direct and inverse flow
are adjoint monotonic functions SdirI(h) a invI(h)T : inf oI(G)
?inf oI(G0), since dirI(h)(S)§IG0S0 iff S§IGinvI(h)(S0). An
information system morphism h : S[S0 in Info(I) consists of a
collection fhn : Sn?S0njn [ Ig of component olog morphisms, which
are systematically coordinated and preserve alignment in the sense that
they satisfy the naturality conditions Se0hm~hn0S0e for any indexing
link e : n?m in I; equivalently, h is a morphism between the
underlying distributed systems h : G[G0 and the direct flow of S is at
least as general as S0: dirI(h)(S)§IG0S0. The ordering S§IGS0 is an
information system morphism h : S[S0 with identity component
translations hn~idGn for each index n [ I.
4.3.4 Channels. We continue with our systems point-of-view.
Since we have represented the whole system as a diagram S of parts
(ologs) Sn with part-part relations (alignment constraints) Sn?Sm,
we also want to represent the whole system as an olog C with part-
whole relations Sn?C. The theory of part-whole relations is called
mereology. It studies how parts are related to wholes, and how
parts are related to other parts within a whole. An information
channel Sc : M[D(C),CT consists of an indexed family
fcn : Gn?Cjn [ Ig of graph morphisms called flow links with a
common target graph C called the core of the channel. A channel
Sc,CT covers a distributed system G of shape I when the part-whole
relationships respect the alignment constraints (are consistent with
the part-part relationships): cn~Ge0cm for each indexing morphism
e : n?m in I. A covering channel is a distributed system morphism
c : G[D(C) in Dist(I) from distributed system G to constant
distributed system D(C) : I?Gph. Such a channel defines a direct
flow operator dirI(c) : inf oI(G)?inf oI(D(C)) and an inverse flow
operator invI(c) : inf oI(D(C))?inf oI(G). For any two covering
channels Sc’,C’T and Sc,CT over the same distributed system G, a
refinement H : Sc’,C’T?Sc,CT is a graph morphism between
cores H : C’?C that respects the part-whole relationships of the
two channels: c’n0H~cn for n [ I. In such a situation, we say the
channel Sc’,C’T is a refinement of the channel Sc,CT. A channel
Si,
‘
G T is called a minimal cover (using information flow
terminology [14]) or an optimal(ly refined covering) channel of a
distributed system G when it covers G and for any other covering
channel Sc,CT there is a unique refinement ½c,C :‘G?C from
Si,
‘
G T to Sc,CT.
4.3.5 System flow. In order to represent an information
system S~fSn Se Smg as a single olog
‘
S , called the fusion of
S, with part-whole relations Sn?
‘
S , we follow the colimit
theorem of [19] by recognizing the following three properties.
N Optimal channels exist for any distributed system G.
N f br(G) is a complete preorder for any graph G, loosely called a
‘‘lattice’’.
N For any graph morphismH : G1?G2, direct and inverse flow are
adjoint monotonic functions Sdir(H),inv(H)T : f br(G1)?
f br(G2).
Let G [ Dist(I) be a distributed system of shape I with optimal
channel Si,
‘
G T. The optimal core G^~
‘
G is called the sum of
the distributed system G, and the optimal channel components
(graph morphisms) fin : Gn?
‘
G jn [ Ig are called flow links.
There is a direct system flow monotonic function (see Diagram 28)
dirSI,GT~dirI(i):_IG^ : inf oI(G)?f br(G^). Direct system flow has
two steps: (i) direct (fixed shape) system flow of an information
system along the optimal channel (Dist(I)-morphism) i : G[D G^
 
and (ii) lattice join combining the contributions of the parts into a
whole. In the opposite direction, there is an inverse system flow
monotonic function (see Diagram 28) invSI,GT~DIG^
:invI(i) :
f br(G^)?inf oI(G). Inverse system flow has two steps: (i) mapping
an olog with core language G^ to a constant information system
over D G^
 
with shape I by distributing the olog to the locations
n [ I, and (ii) inverse (fixed shape) system flow of this constant
information system back along the optimal channel i : G[D G^
 
.
Direct system flow is adjoint to inverse system flow
SdirSI,GT a invSI,GTT : inf oI(G)?f br(G^), since the composition
components are adjoint. For any distributed system G [ Dist(I)
with optimal core G^~‘G, any information system S [ inf oI(G),
and any olog S^ [ f br (G^)
 
, entailment satisfies the following
axioms.
These are converted to inference rules in Table 1.
Information flow can be used to compute the fusion olog for an
information system and to define the consequence of an
information system. Fusion is direct system flow, and consequence
is the composition of direct and inverse system flow. Let
S [ inf oI(G) be any information system. The fusion‘
S~dirSI,GT(S)~S
‘
G ,_n [ I dir(in)(En)T [ f br(G^) is an olog
that represents the whole system in a centralized fashion [20],[17].
The consequence S%SI,GT~invSI,GT(dirSI,GT(S))~invSI,GT(
‘
S )~
finv(in)(
‘
S )jn [ Ig [ inf oI(G) is an information system that
represents the whole system in a distributed fashion [17]. It is
inverse flow of the fusion olog along the optimal channel, transfering
the entailed facts of the whole system to the component parts. By
allowing system shape to vary, channels can be generalized to
morphisms of distributed systems. Then a notion of relative fusion
(direct system flow) can be defined in terms of left Kan extension,
and a notion of relative system consequence can be defined as the
composition of direct followed by inverse system flow.
The consequence operator ({ )%, which is defined on
information systems, is a closure operator on the complete
preorder inf oI(G), and by taking the coproduct it is a closure
operator on the complete preorder Info(I)~
‘
G [ Dist(I) inf oI(G):
(increasing) S§S%, (monotonic) S§S0 implies S%§S0% and
ð28Þ
Ologs: A Categorical Framework for KR
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 12 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e24274
(idempotent) S%%~S%. Pointwise entailment order ƒ on Info(I)
is only a preliminary order, since it does not incorporate
interactions between system component parts. System entailment
order [ on Info(I) is defined by S1[S2 when S%1ƒS%2 ;
equivalently, S%1ƒS2. Pointwise order is stronger than system
entailment order: S1ƒS2 implies S1[S2. This is a specialization-
generalization order. Any information system S is entailment
equivalent to its consequence S%S%. An information system S is
closed when it is equal to its consequence S~S%.
The whole effect of taking the system consequence may be
greater than the sum of its parts, in the sense that Sn§nS%inn
§n _m inv(in)(dir(im)(Sm))§nS%n for any n [ I, since separate parts
may have a productive interaction at the channel core. A final part
of an information system is a part with no non-trivial constraint links
from it. (The graphical subsystem beneath) nonfinal parts are
necessary for the alignment of information systems, resulting in the
equivalencing of types and aspects through quotienting. However,
because of the covering condition in~Ge0im and the entailment
order dir(Ge)(En)§mEm for constraint links Se : Sn?Sm, only the
fact(ual) content of final parts of information systems are necessary
to compute the system fusion and consequence.
4.3.6 General examples. Here are some examples of system
fusion/consequence.
N An information system S with a constant underlying distributed
system, Gi~G for all n [ I, gathers together all the component
parts of the information system and forms their consequence. It
has identity flow links fin~idG : G?G~
‘
G jn [ Ig, compo
nent join fusion
‘
S~_n [ I Sn~SG,
S
n [ I EnT, and constant
system consequence S%n~ _n’ [ I Sn’ð Þ. for all n [ I.
N A discrete information system S~fSn~SGn,EnTjn [ Ig with
no constraint links Ge : Sn?Sm for n=m, has coproduct
injection flow links in : Gn?zn [ IGn, non-restricting fusion,
and inverse flow projecting back to individual component
consequence S%n~S.n for all n [ I. No alignment (constraint)
links means no interaction.
N An information system S~fS1 H1 S H2 S2g consisting of a
single common ground S~SG,ET between two component
ologs S1~SG1,E1T and S2~SG2,E2T, with underlying
distributed system (span) G~fG1 H1 G H2 G2g, has pushout
injection flow links G1
i1 ‘
G
i2 G2, direct image union
fusion
‘
S~langle
‘
G ,dir(i1)(E1)|dir(i2)(E2)T, and system
consequence components S%n~SGn,inv(in)(dir(i1)(E1)|dir(i2)
(E2))T for n~1,2. The flow links will quotient any types and
aspects that are connected through the common ground
allowing for the approprate interaction in the fusion conse
quence (dir(i1)(E1)|dir(i2)(E2))
., then the inverse flow will
reconnect this with the component types and aspects.
4.4 Conceptual graphs
The conceptual graph formalism (CG) for knowledge represen-
tation [15], was initially formulated to represent database systems
(DBS), but is now used in natural language processing (NLP) and
first-order logic (FOL). Verbs in NLP can often be represented
relationally by star(-shaped conceptual) graphs. For example, the
sentence ‘‘John is going to Boston by bus’’ might be represented by
the conceptual graph
In a sentence of natural language, thematic roles are semantic
descriptions of the way (the entities described by) a noun phrase
functions with respect to (the action of) the verb. These entities are
the participants in the occurrent expressed by the verb. For the
action of ‘going’ in the above sentence there are three participants
and hence three thematic roles. ‘John’ plays the role of the agent of
the action, a ‘Bus’ is the instrument used in the action and ‘Boston’
is the destination of the action. Translations using thematic roles
can be used to align two ontologies with respect to a common
ground. A CG-style translation of conceptual graph (29) would
replace the verb relation ‘going’ with a concept ‘Go’ and replace
the edges that form the signature of the ‘going’ relation with binary
relations for the three roles ‘agent’, ‘instrument’ and ‘destination’.
However, the case relations that semantically describe the thematic
roles should be viewed as functional in nature; that is, for any instance
of the action of a sentence’s verb there is a unique entity described by a
noun phrase of the sentence. When this semantics is respected, the
translation to thematic roles becomes a process of ‘‘linearization’’,
which is best described abstractly as: (1) the identification of relation
types with entity types, (2) the translation of a sorted multiarity relation
to a span of functions, one function for each role, and (3) the functional
interpretation of thematic roles.
The Olog formalism, which also represents DBS and NLP, is a
version of equational logic. Both the Olog and CG formalisms
were designed as graphical representations. However, the CG
formalism is binary and relational, whereas the Olog formalism is
unary and functional. The CG formalism is binary since it has two
kinds of type, concepts and relations; it is relational in the way it
interprets edges. The Olog formalism is unary since it has only one
kind of type, the abstract concept; it is functional in the way it
interprets aspects (edges). However, much of the semantics of the
CG formalism can be transformed to the Olog formalism by the
process of linearization, thereby gaining in efficiency and
conciseness. This linearization process works for any binary/
relational knowledge representation, such as CGs, entity-relation-
ship data modelling [21], relational database systems or the
Information Flow Framework [22]. In the entity-relationship data
modelling, n-ary relationship links are replaced by n-ary spans of
aspects and attributes are included as types.
For example, the conceptual graph (29) can be linearized to the
olog graph in diagram (31), where 1 is the universal type to which
all types have a unique aspect. Since olog aspects are interpreted
functionally, the functional nature of thematic roles is respected. In
this manner, the olog formalism could be used to replace the CG
representation of ontologies. For example, a community (acting as
an individual) could build its ontology C from ground up by aligning
it with some top-level reference ontology T (such as in the appendix
of [15]), thereby importing some formal semantics from T . The
following fragment demonstrates how this works.
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Assume that ontology T contains the concept of ‘‘spatial process’’
as represented by the general concept type with aspects
Spatial{Process
agent
Agent , Spatial{Process inst Vehicle and
Spatial{Process dest Location . At some stage assume that the
community ontology C has specified the concept type orderings
PersonƒAgent , BusƒVehicle and CityƒLocation with
corresponding injective aspects Person is Agent , Bus is Vehicle
and City is Location . At the next stage it could define a concept
type with aspects C
person
Person , C bus Bus and C
city
City , and
link it with the reference ontology concept by specifying a connecting
aspect C
process
Spatial{Process and asserting the facts
‘person ; is~process ; agent ’, ‘bus ; is~process ; vehicle ’
and ‘city ; is~process ; location ’. In the more expressive ologs
with joins (Section 5), the process concept of ‘‘going to city by bus’’ can
then be defined as the pullback of the ‘‘spatial process’’ concept: here,
the concept type with aspects Go
person
Person , Go bus Bus and
Go
city
City is pulled back along the above injective aspects, resulting
in the injective aspect Go is Spatial{Process with corresponding
concept type ordering GoƒSpatial{Process . As a result, the
concept C has the new mediating aspect C
going
Go , which satisfies
the fact ‘going ; is~process ’. In this manner the community
ontology C has been enlarged.
We assume that community ontology C and reference
ontology T are combined into a portal ontology P with portal
link C P P and alignment link T A P. If some other ontology
C0 is built up and aligned in the same fashion, then T is being
used as a common ground, and we have a ‘W’-shaped
information system
with portals P and P0 being the final parts. This ‘W’-shaped
information system uses the sketch institution Sk for ologs. It can
be compared to the ‘W’-shaped information system in [23], which
uses the information flow IF institution for (local) logics.
5 More expressive ologs I
In this section and the next (5 and 6) we will introduce limits and
colimits within the context of ologs. These will allow authors to
build ologs that are quite expressive. For example we can declare
one type to be the union or intersection of other types. We do not
assume mathematical knowledge beyond that of sets and functions,
which were loosely defined in Section 2.2. However, the reader
may benefit by consulting a reference on category theory, such as
[5].
The basic ologs discussed in previous sections are based on the
mathematical notion of categories, whereas the olog presentation
language we will discuss in this section and the next are based on
general sketches (see [24]). The difference is in what can be expressed:
in basic ologs we can declare types, aspects, and facts, whereas in
general ologs we can express ideas like products and sums, as we
will see below.
We will begin by discussing layouts, which will be represented
categorically by ‘‘finite limits’’. As usual, the english terminology
(layout) is not precise enough to express the notion we mean it to
express (limit). Intuitively, a limit can be thought of as a system: it
is a collection of units, each of a specific type, such that these
units have compatible aspects. These will include types like
aman and awomanwith the same last name . In Section 6 we will
discuss groupings, which will be represented by colimits. These will
include types like a thing that is either a paper or awatermelon .
5.1 Layouts
A dictionary might define the word layout as something like
‘‘a structured arrangement of items within certain limits; a plan
for such arrangement.’’ In other words, we can lay out or
specify the need for a set of parts, each of a given type, such
that the parts fit together well. This idea roughly corresponds to
the notion of limits in category theory, especially limits in the
category of sets. Given a diagram of sets and functions, its limit
is the set of ways to accordingly choose one element from each.
For example, we could have a type a car and a driver , which
category-theoretically is a product, but which we are calling a
‘‘layout’’ – a compound type whose parts are ‘‘laid out.’’ Of
course, the term layout is insufficient to express the precise
meaning of limits, but it will have to do for now. To understand
limits, one really only need understand pullbacks and products.
These will be the subjects of Sections 5.2 and 5.3, or one can
see [5] for more details.
5.2 Pullbacks
Given three objects and two arrows arranged as to the left, the
pullback is the commutative square to the right
We write A~B|DC and say ‘‘A is the pullback of B and C
over D.’’ The question is, what does it signify? We will begin with
some examples and then give a precise definition.
5.2.1 Example. We will now give four examples to
motivate the definition of pullback. In the first example, (34),
both B and C will be subtypes of D, and in such cases the
pullback will be their intersection. In the next two examples
(35 and 36), only B will be a subtype of D, and in such cases the
pullback will be the ‘‘corresponding subtype of C’’ (as should
make sense upon inspection). In the last example (37), neither
B nor C will be a subtype of D. In each line below, the
pullback of the diagram to the left is the diagram to the right.
The reader should think of the left-hand olog as a kind of
problem to which the new box A in the right-hand olog is a
solution.
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See Example 5.2.3 for a justification of these, in light of
Definition 5.2.2.
The following is the definition of pullbacks in the category of
sets. For an olog, the instance data are given by sets (at least in this
paper, see Section 3), so this definition suffices for now. See [5] for
more details on pullbacks.
5.2.2 Definition. Let B,C, and D be sets, and let f : B?D
and g : C?D be functions. The pullback of B f D g C,
denoted B|DC, is defined to be the set
B|DC :~f(b,c) j b [ B,c [ C,and f (b)~g(c)g
together with the obvious maps B|DC?B and B|DC?C,
which send an element (b,c) to b and to c, respectively. In other
words, the pullback of B
f
D
g
C is a commutative square
5.2.3 Example. In Example 5.2.1 we gave four examples of
pullbacks. For each, we will consider B
f
D
g
C to be sets and
functions as in Definition 5.2.2 and explain how the set A follows
that definition, i.e., how its label fits with the set
B|DC~f(b,c) j b [ B,c [ C,and f (b)~g(c)g.
In the case of (34), the set B|DC should consist of pairs (w,l)
where w is a wealthy customer, l is a loyal customer, and w is equal
to l (as customers). But if w and l are the same customer then (w,l)
is just a customer that is both wealthy and loyal, not two different
customers. In other words, an instance of the pullback is a
customer that is both loyal and wealthy, so the label of A fits.
In the case of (35), the set B|DC should consist of pairs (p,b)
where p is a person, b is the color blue, and the favorite color of p
is equal to b (as colors). In other words, it is a person whose
favorite color is blue, so the label of A fits. If desired, one could
instead label A with a pair p,bð Þwhere p is a person, b is blue,
and the favorite color of p is b .
In the case of (36), the set B|DC should consist of pairs (d,w)
where d is a dog, w is a woman, and the owner of d is equal to w
(as people). In other words, it is a dog whose owner is a woman, so
the label of A fits. If desired, one could instead label A with a pair
d,wð Þwhere d is a person ,w is blue, and the owner of d isw .
In the case of (37), the setB|DC should consist of pairs (f ,s)where
f is a piece of furniture, s is a space in our house, and the width of f is
equal to the width of s. This is fits perfectly with the label of A.
5.2.4 Using pullbacks to classify. To distinguish between
two things, one must find a common aspect of the two things for
which they have differing results. For example, a pen is different
from a pencil in that they both use some material to write (a
common aspect), but the two materials they use are different. Thus
the material which a writing implement uses is an aspect of writing
implements, and this aspect serves to segregate or classify them.
We can think of three such writing-materials: graphite, ink, and
pigment-wax. For each, we will make a layout in the olog below:
One could also replace the label of box A1 with ‘‘a pencil’’, the
label of box A2 with ‘‘a pen’’, and the label of box A3 with ‘‘a
crayon’’; in so doing, the layouts at the top would define a pencil, a
pen, and a crayon to be a writing implement that uses respectively
graphite, ink, and pigment-wax.
5.2.5 Building pullbacks on pullbacks. There is a theorem
in category theory which states the following. Suppose given two
commutative squares
such that the right-hand square (3,4,5,6) is a pullback. It follows
that if the left-hand square (1,2,3,4) is a pullback then so is the big
rectangle (1,2,5,6). It also follows that if the big rectangle (1,2,5,6)
is a pullback then so is the left-hand square (1,2,3,4). This fact can
be useful in authoring ologs.
For example, the type a cellphone that has a bad battery is
vague, but we can lay out precisely what it means using pullbacks
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The category-theoretic fact described above says that since
A~B|DC and C~D|FE, it follows that A~B|FE. That is,
we can deduce the definition ‘‘a cellphone that has a bad battery is
defined as a cellphone that has a battery which remains charged
for less than one hour.’’ In other words, A~B|FE.
5.3 Products
Given a set of types (boxes) in an olog, one can select one
instance from each. All the ways of doing just that comprise what
is called the product of these types. For example, if
A~a number between 1 and 10 and B~a letter between x and
z , the product includes a total of 30 elements, including (4,z). We
are ready for the definition.
5.3.1 Definition. Given sets A,B, their product, denoted
A|B, is the set
A|B~f(a,b) j a [ A and b [ Bg: ð42Þ
There are two obvious projection maps A|B?A and A|B?B,
sending the pair (a,b) to a and to b respectively.
5.3.2 Example. In Example 5.2.1, (37) we presented the idea
of a piece of furniture that was the same width as a space in the
house. What if we say that a nice furniture placement is any
space that is between 1 and 8 inches bigger than a piece of
furniture? We can use a combination of products and pullbacks to
create the appropriate type
Here B and D are products and A is a pullback. This olog
lays out what it means to be ‘‘a nice furniture placement’’ using
products. The bottom horizontal aspect B?D is an example of a
map obtained by the ‘‘universal property of products’’; see Section
5.6.
5.3.3 Products of more (or fewer) types. The product of
two sets A and B was defined in 5.3.1. One may also take the
product of three sets A,B,C in a similar way, so the elements are
triples (a,b,c) where a [ A,b [ B, and c [ C. In fact this idea holds
for any number of sets. It even makes sense to take the product of
one set (just A) or no sets! The product of one set is itself, and the
product of no sets is the singleton set fg. For more on this, see
Section 5.5 or [6].
5.4 Declaring an injective aspect
A function is called injective if different inputs always yield
different outputs. For example the function that doubles every
integer (x.2x) is injective, whereas the function that squares
every integer (x.x2) is not because 32~({3)2. An example of an
injective aspect is awoman is a person because different
women are always different as people. An example of a non-
injective aspect is a person has as father a person because different
people may have the same father.
The easiest way to indicate that an aspect is injective is to use a
‘‘hook arrow’’ as in f : A B, instead of a regular arrow
f : A?B, to denote it. For example, the first map is injective (and
specified as such with a hook-arrow), but the second is not in the
olog:
The author of this olog believes that no two people can have
precisely the same personality (though they may have the same
personality type).
We include injective aspects in this section because it turns out
that injectivity can also be specified by pullbacks. See [25] for
details.
5.5 Singleton types
A singleton set is a set with one element; it can be considered the
‘‘empty product.’’ In other words if we denote An~A|A|   A
(where A is written n times), then A0 is the empty product and is a
singleton set. One can specify that a certain type has only one instance
by annotating it with A~fg in the olog. For example the olog
says that the author considers God to be single. As a more
concrete example, the intersection of fx [ R j x§0g and fy
[ R j xƒ0g is a singleton set, as expressed in the olog
The fact that A~B|DC and A~fg are declared indicates that
there is only one possible instance of a real number that is in both B
and C.
5.6 The universal property of layouts
We cannot do the notion of universal properties justice in this
paper, but the basic idea is as follows. Suppose that D is an olog,
that D1,D2 are types in it, and that D~D1|D2 (together with its
projection maps p1 : D?D1 and p2 : D?D2) is their product.
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The so-called universal property of products should be thought
of as ‘‘an existence and uniqueness’’ claim in D. Namely, for any
type X with maps f : X?D1 and g : X?D2, there is exactly one
possible map m : X?D such that the facts f~m; p1 and g~m; p2
hold.
This may sound esoteric, but consider the following example.
The following olog in similar to the one in Example 5.3.2
Here the only unlabeled map is the horizontal one B?D; how
can we get away with leaving it unlabeled? How does a piece of
furniture and a space in the house yield a pair of numbers? The
answer is that B has a map to D1 (the path across the top) and a
map to D2 (the path across the bottom), and hence the universal
property of products gives a unique arrow B?D such that the two
facts indicated by checkmarks hold. (In terms of (46) and (47) we
are using X~B.) In other words, there is exactly one way to take a
piece of furniture and a space in the house and yield a pair of
numbers if we enforce that the first number is the width in inches
of the piece of furniture and the second number is the width in
inches of the space in the house.
At this point we hope it is clear that the universal property of
products is a useful and constructive one. We will not describe the
other universal properties (either for pullbacks, singletons, or any
colimits); as mentioned above they can be found in [5].
6 More expressive ologs II
In this section we will describe various colimits, which are in
some sense dual to limits. Whereas limits allow one to ‘‘lay out’’ a
team consisting of many different interacting or non-interacting
parts, colimits allow one to ‘‘group’’ different types together. For
example, whereas the product of a number between 1 and 10 of
and a letter between x and z has 30 elements (such as (3,y)), the
coproduct of these two types has 13 elements (including 4). Just as
‘‘layout’’ is a too weak a word to capture the essence of limits,
‘‘grouping’’ is too weak a word to capture the essence of colimits,
but it will have to do.
We will start by describing coproducts or ‘‘disjoint unions’’ in
Section 6.1. Then we will describe pushouts in Section 6.2,
wherein one can declare some elements in a union to be equivalent
to others. There is a category-theoretic duality between coproducts
and products and between pushouts and pullbacks. It extends to a
duality between surjections and injections and a duality between
empty types and singleton types, the subject of Sections 6.3 and
6.4. The interested reader can see [5] for details.
6.1 Coproducts
Coproducts are also called ‘‘disjoint unions.’’ If A and B are sets
with no members in common, then the coproduct of A and B is
their union. However, if they have elements in common, one must
include both copies in A
‘
B and differentiate between them.
Here is a definition.
6.1.1 Definition. Given sets A and B, their coproduct, denoted
A
‘
B, is the set
A
a
B~f(a,‘‘A") j a [ Ag|f(b,‘‘B") j b [ Bg: ð50Þ
There are two obvious inclusion maps A?A
‘
B and B?A
‘
B,
sending a to (a,‘‘A") and b to (b,‘‘B"), respectively.
If A and B have no elements in common, then the one can drop
the ‘‘A’’ and ‘‘B’’ labels without changing the set A
‘
B in a
substantial way. Here are two examples that should make the
coproduct idea clear.
6.1.2 Example. In the following olog the types A and B are
disjoint, so the coproduct C~A
‘
B is just the union.
6.1.3 Example. In the following olog, A and B are not
disjoint, so care must be taken to differentiate common elements.
Since ducks can both swim and fly, each duck is found twice in
C, once labeled as a flyer and once labeled as a swimmer. The
types A and B are kept disjoint in C, which justifies the name
‘‘disjoint union.’’
6.2 Pushouts
Pushouts can express unions in which an overlap is declared.
They can also express ‘‘quotients,’’ where different objects can be
declared equivalent. Given three objects and two arrows arranged
as to the left, the pushout is drawn as the commutative square to
the right
We write D~B
‘
AC and say ‘‘D is the pushout of B and C
along A.’’ The question is, what does it signify?
The idea is that an instance of the pushout B
‘
AC is any
instance of B or any instance of C, but where some instances are
considered equivalent to others. That is, for any instance of A, its
B-aspect is considered the same as its C-aspect. This is formalized
in Definition 6.2.2 after being exemplified in Example 6.2.1.
6.2.1 Example. In each example below, the diagram to the
right is the pushout of the diagram to the left. The new object, D,
is the union of B and C, but instances of A are equated to their B
and C aspects. This will be discussed after the two diagrams.
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In the olog (52), the shoulder is seen as part of the arm and part
of the torso. When taking the union of these two parts, we do not
want to ‘‘double-count’’ the shoulder (as would be done in the
coproduct B
‘
C, see Example 6.1.3). Thus we create a new type
A for cells in the shoulder, which are considered the same whether
viewed as cells in the arm or cells in the body. In general, if one
wishes to take two things and glue them together, the glue serves as
A and the two things serve as B and C, and the union (or
grouping) is the pushout B
‘
AC.
In the olog (53), if every mathematics course is simply ‘‘too
hard,’’ then when reading off a list of courses, each math course
will not be read aloud but simply read as ‘‘too hard.’’ To form D
we begin by taking the union of B and C, and then we consider
everything in A to be the same whether one looks at it as a course
or as the phrase ‘‘too hard.’’ The math courses are all blurred
together as one thing. Thus we see that the power to equate
different things can be exercised with pushouts.
6.2.2 Definition. Let A,B, and C be sets and let f : A?B
and g : A?C be functions. The pushout of B f A g C,
denoted B
‘
AC, is the quotient of B
‘
C (see Definition 6.1.1)
by the equivalence relation generated by declaring b*c (i.e., b is
equivalent to c) if: b [ B,c [ C, and there exists a [ A with f (a)~b
and g(a)~c.
6.3 Declaring a surjective aspect
A function f : A?B is called surjective if every value inB is the image
of something in the domain A. For example, the function which
subtracts 1 from every integer (x.x{1) is surjective, because every
integer has a successor; whereas the function that doubles every integer
(x.2x) is not surjective because odd numbers are not mapped to. The
aspect is a published paper
was published in
an established journal is
surjective because every established journal has had at least
one paper published in it. The aspect is a published
paper has as first author a person is not surjective because not every
person is the first author of a published paper.
The easiest way to indicate that an aspect is surjective is to
denote it with a ‘‘two-headed arrow’’ as in f : A B. For example,
the second map is surjective (and indicated with a two-headed
arrow) in the olog
Here the first aspect is not considered surjective, presumably
because the author imagines personalities had by no person.
We include surjective aspects in this section because it turns out
that surjectivity can also be specified by pushouts. See [26] for
details.
6.4 Empty types
The empty set is a set with no elements; it can be considered
the ‘‘empty coproduct.’’ In other words if we denote n  A
~A
‘
A
‘   ‘A (where A is written n times), then 0  A is
the empty coproduct and is the empty set. One can declare a type to
be empty by annotating it with A~1 in the olog.
says that the set of supernatural beings is empty. As a more
concrete example, the intersection of positive numbers and
negative numbers is empty, as expressed in the olog
6.5 Images
In what remains of Section 6, we will discuss how the ideas of
this section and the previous (Section 5) can be used together to
create quite expressive ologs. First we will discuss how each aspect
f : A?B has an ‘‘image,’’ the subset of B that are ‘‘hit’’ by f .
Then, in Sections 6.6 and 6.7, we will discuss how ologs can
express all primitive recursive functions and many other
mathematical concepts. Consider the olog
Some people own more than one computer, and some
computers are owned by more than one person. Some computers
are not owned by a person, and some people do not own a
computer. The purpose of this section is to show how to use ologs
to capture ideas such as ‘‘a person who owns a computer’’ and ‘‘a
computer that is owned by a person’’. These are called the images
of p and c respectively.
Every aspect has an image, and these are quite important for
human understanding. For example the image of the map
a person has as father a person is the type a father . In other
words, a father is defined to be a person x for which there is some
other person y such that x is the father of y.
The image of a function f : A?B is a commutative diagram (fact)
ð54Þ
ð55Þ
ð56Þ
ð57Þ
ð58Þ
ð59Þ
ð60Þ
Ologs: A Categorical Framework for KR
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 18 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e24274
where fs is surjective and fi is injective (see Sections 6.3 and 5.4).
We indicate that a type is the image of a map f by annotating it
with Im(f ), as in follow olog:
Hopefully it is also clear that a personwho owns a computer
and a computer that is owned by a person are the images of
p : X?Y and c : X?Z (respectively) in Olog (57).
Using the label Im(f ) is the easiest way to indicate an image,
although one can also do so categorically using limits and colimits.
See [6, Chapter VIII] for details.
6.6 Application: Primitive recursion
We have already seen how ologs can be used to express a
conceptual understanding of a situation (all the ologs thus far
exemplify this idea). In this section we hope to convince the reader
that ologs are also able to express certain computations. In
particular we will show by example that primitive recursive
functions (like factorial or fibonacci) can be expressed by ologs. In
this way, we can to put computation and knowledge representa-
tion together into the same framework. It would be quite valuable
to strengthen this connection by showing that Ologs (or an
extension thereof) can express any recursive function (i.e., simulate
Turing machines). This is an open research possibility.
Example 6.6.1. In this example we will present an olog that can
represent the ‘‘Factorial function,’’ often denoted n.n!, where for
example the factorial of 4 is 24. Recall that a natural number is any
nonnegative whole number: 0,1,2,3,4, . . ..
The idea of this olog is to convey the factorial function as
follows. A natural number is either zero or positive. Every positive
natural number n has a decrement, n{1. The factorial of zero is
1. The factorial of a positive number n is obtained by multiplying n
by the factorial of n{1.
To more explicitly describe the above olog, we must describe its
intended instances. Hopefully the instances of each type (A
through E) are self-explanatory, so we will describe the grouping,
the layout, the aspects, and the facts. The set of natural numbers is
the disjoint union of zero and the set of positive natural numbers
and the maps i0 and i1 are the inclusions into the coproduct, which
explains the grouping C~A
‘
E. The layout B~A|D is self-
explanatory, and the maps p and q are the projections from the
product. The map d is the decrement map n.n{1, the map v
sends 0 to 1, the map m is multiplication (n,n’).n  n’. Once m, d,
and v are so-defined, the first two facts (s; p~idA and s; q~d; f )
specify that s sends n to the pair (n,f (d(n))), and the second two
facts specify that f sends 0 to 1 and sends a positive number n to
m(s(n))~m(n,f (d(n))), i.e., n goes to the product n  (n{1)!.
The above olog defines the factorial function (f ) in terms of
itself, which is the hallmark of primitive recursion. Note, however,
that this same olog can compute many things besides the factorial
function. That is, nothing about the olog says that the instances of
Zero is the set f0g, that v sends 0 to 1, that d is the decrement
function, or that m is multiplication – changing any of these will
change f as a function. For example, the same olog can be used to
compute ‘‘triangle numbers’’ (e.g. f(4) = 1+2+3+4= 10) by simply
changing the instances of v and m in the obvious ways (use
v~0,m~z rather than v~1,m~  )). For a radical departure,
fix any forest (set of graphical trees) F , let E~ zero represent its
set of roots, A the other nodes, v the constant 0 function, d the
parent function, and m sending (p,d(p)) to f (d(p))z1. Then for
each tree in F and each node n in that tree, the function f will
send n to its height on the tree.
Primitive recursion is a powerful technique for deriving new
functions from the repetition of others using a kind of ‘‘while
loop.’’ The general form of primitive recursive functions can be
found in [27], and it is not hard to imitate Example 6.6.1 for the
general case.
6.7 Application: Defining mathematical concepts
In this subsection we hope to convince the reader that many
mathematical concepts can be defined by ologs. This should not
seem like much of a stretch: ologs describe relationships between
sets, so we rely on the maxim that all of mathematics can be
formulated within set theory. To make the idea explicit, however,
we will recall the definition of pseudo-metric space (in 6.7.1) and
then provide an olog with the same content (in 61).
6.7.1 Definition. Let R§0 denote the set of non-negative real
numbers. A pseudo-metric space is a pair (X ,d) where X is a set and
d : X|X?R§0 is a function with the following properties for all
elements x,y,z [ X :
1. d(x,x)~0;
2. d(x,y)~d(y,x); and
3. d(x,z)ƒd(x,y)zd(y,z).
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As long as the instances for the right-hand side of the olog are
mathematically correct (i.e., we assign 4 the set of non-negative
real numbers), this olog has the same content as Definition 6.7.1.
One can use ologs to define usual metric spaces (in which Property
(1) in Definition 6.7.1 is strengthened), but it would have taken too
much space here.
It should be clear that ologs provide a more precise and explicit
description of any concept, relying less on the grammar of English
and more on the mathematical ‘‘grammar’’ of sets and functions.
Assumptions are exposed as all the working parts of an object need
to be explicitly documented. Thus an olog is likely to be instantly
readable by a theorem prover such as Coq ([28]), at least if one
creates the olog within an appropriate Olog-Coq interface API.
Moreover, various parts of this olog may be reusable in other
contexts, and hence connect pseudo-metric spaces into a web of
neighboring definitions and theorems.
In fact, once a corpus of mathematics has been written in olog
form, evidence of conjectures not yet proven could be written
down as instance data. For example, one could record every
known prime as instances of a type and a machine could
automatically check that Goldbach’s conjecture (written as an olog
containing as a type) holds for all example ‘‘so far.’’ With
definitions, theorems, and examples all written in the same
computer-readable language of ologs, one may hope for much
more advanced searching and knowledge retrieval by humans. For
example, one could formulate very precise questions as database
queries and use SQL on the database corresponding to a given
olog (see Section 3.2).
7 Further directions
Ologs are basically categories which have text labels to explain
their intended semantic. As such there are many directions to
explore ranging from quite theoretical to quite practical. Here we
consider three main classes: extending the theory of ologs, studying
communication with ologs, and implementing ologs in the real
world.
7.1 Extending the theory of ologs
In this paper we began by discussing basic ologs, which are rich
enough to capture the semantic of many situations. In Sections 5
and 6 we added more expressivity to ologs to allow one to encode
ideas such as intersections, unions, and images. However, ologs
could be even more expressive. One could add ‘‘function types’’
(also known as exponentials); add a ‘‘subobject classifier type,’’
which could allow for negation and complements as well as power-
sets; or even add fixed sets (like the set of Strings) to the language
of ologs. This is not too hard (using sketches, see [24]); the reason
we did not include them in this paper was more because of space
than any other reason.
Another generalization would be to allow the instances of an olog
to take values in a category other than Set. For example, one could
have an instance-space rather than an instance-set, e.g. it is clear
that the instances of the type a point on the unit circle constitute a
topological space. One could similarly argue that the instances of
the type a human invention have a topology or metric as well (e.g.
as an invention, the cellphone is closer to the telephone than it is to
artificial flavoring). Instance data on an olog C corresponds to a
functor C?Set in this paper, but it is quite easy to replace Set with a
different category such as Top (the category of topological spaces),
and this may have interesting uses in data modeling.
In Section 6.7, we explicitly showed that pseudo-metric spaces
(and we stated further that metric spaces) can be presented by
ologs. It would be interesting to see if theorems could also be
proven entirely within the context of ologs. If so, a teacher could
first sketch a mathematical proof as a small or sparse olog C, and
then use a functor C?D to rigorously ‘‘zoom in’’ on that proof so
that the sketch becomes a full-fledged proof (as the maps in C are
factored into understandable units in D).
If ologs are to be viable venues in which to discuss results in
mathematics, then they should be capable of describing all
recursion, not just primitive recursion (as in Section 6.6). We do
not yet have an understanding for how this can be done. If
recursion can be fully defined with the ologs described above, it
would be interesting to see it written out; if not, it would be
interesting to understand what basic idea could be gracefully
added to ologs so that recursion becomes expressible.
In a different direction, one could test the expressive power of
ologs by defining simple games, like Tic Tac Toe or Chess, using
ologs. It would be impressive to define a vocabulary for writing
games and a program which could automatically convert an olog-
defined game into a playable computer game. This would show
that the same theory that we have seen express ideas about
fatherhood and factorials can also be used to invent games and
program computers.
7.2 Studying communication with ologs
As discussed in Section 4, ologs can be connected by functors
into networks that are not just 2-way, but n-way. These
communication networks should be studied: what kinds of
information can pass, how reliable is it, how quickly can it spread,
etc. This may be applicable in fields from economics to psychology
to sociology. Such research may use results from established
mathematics such as Network Coding Theory (see [29]).
Spivak and coauthor Mathieu Anel are preparing for publica-
tion the results of their mathematical description of how two or
more entities (described as ologs) can communicate new ideas (not
just new instance data) to each other. It would be interesting to see
how well this ‘‘communication protocol’’ works in practice, and
whether it can be theoretically automated. Furthermore, this
communication protocol and any theoretical automation of it
should be implemented on a computer to see if different database
schemas can be meaningfully integrated with minimal human
assistance.
It may be possible to train children to create ologs about their
interests or about a given lesson. These ologs would show how the
child actually perceives something, which would probably be
fascinating. By our experience and that of people we have taught,
the process of building an olog usually leads to a clarification of the
concepts involved. Moreover, a class project to connect the ologs
of different students and between the students and the teacher,
may have excellent pedagogical benefits.
Finally, it may be interesting to study ‘‘local truth’’ vs. ‘‘global
truth’’ in a network of ologs. Functorial connections between ologs
can allow for translation of ideas between members of a group, but
there may be ideas which do not extend globally, just as a Mo¨bius
band does not admit a global orientation. That is, given three
parties on the Mo¨bius band, any pair can agree on a compass
orientation, but there is no choice that the three can simulta-
neously agree on. Similarly, whether or not it is possible to
construct a global language which extends all the existing local
ones could be determined if these local languages and their
connections were entered into a computer olog system.
7.3 Implementing ologs in the real world
Once ologs are implemented on computers, and once people
learn how to author good ologs, much is possible. One advantage
comes in searching the information space. Currently when we
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search for a concept (say in Google or on our hard drive), we can
only describe the concept in words and hope that those words are
found in a document describing the concept. That is, search is
always text-based. Better would be if the concept is meaningfully
interconnected in a web of concepts (an olog) that could be
navigated in a meaningful (as opposed to text-based) way.
Indeed, this is the semantic web vision: When internet data is
machine-readable, search becomes much more powerful. Cur-
rently, we rely on RDF scrapers that scour web pages for Ssubject,
predicate, objectT sentences and store them in RDF format, as
though each such sentence is a fact. Since people are inputting
their data as prose text, this may be the best available method for
now; however, it is quite inaccurate (e.g. often 15% of the facts are
wrong, a number which can lead to degeneration of deductive
reasoning – see [30]). If ideas could be put on the internet such
that they compatibly made sense to both human and computer, it
would give a huge boost to the semantic web. We believe that
ologs can serve as such a human-computer interface.
While it is often assumed that because we all speak the same
language we all must mean the same things by it, this is simply not
true. The age-old question about whether ‘‘blue for me’’ is the
same as ‘‘blue for you’’ is applicable to every single word and
idiom in our language. There is no easy way to sync up different
people’s perceptions. If communication is to be efficient,
agreements must be fairly explicit and precise, and this precision
demands a rigor that is simply unavailable in English prose. It is
available in a network of ologs (as described in Section 4).
For example, the laws of the United States are hopelessly
complex. Residents of the US are required to obey the laws.
However, unlike the rules of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT),
which take 10 minutes for the proctor to read aloud, the laws of
the US are never really expressed – the most important among
them are hopefully picked up by cultural osmosis. If an olog was
created which had enough detail that laws could be written in that
format, then a woman could research for herself whether her
landlord was required to fix her refrigerator or whether this was
her responsibility. It may prove that the olog of laws is internally
inconsistent, i.e., that it is impossible for a person to satisfy all the
laws – such an analysis, if performed, could fundamentally change
our outlook on the legal system.
The same goes for science; information written up in articles is
much less accessible than information that is entered into an
ontology. However, the dream of a single universal ontology is
untenable ([31]). Instead we must allow each lab or institute to
create its own ontology, and then require citations to be functorial
olog connections, rather than mere silo-to-silo pointers. Thus, a
network of ologs should be created to represent the understanding
of the modern scientific community as a multi-faceted whole.
Another impetus for a scientist to write an olog about the study
at hand is that, once an olog is made, it can be instantly converted
to a database schema which the scientist can use to input all the
data pertaining to this study. Indeed, if some data did not fit within
this schema, then the olog must have been insufficient to begin
with and should be modified to fully describe the experiment. If
scientists work this way, then the separation between them and
database modelers can be reduced or eliminated (the scientist
assumes the database modeling role with little additional burden).
Moreover, if functorial connections are established between the
ologs of different labs, then data can be meaningfully shared along
those connections, and ideas written in the language of one lab’s
olog can be translated automatically into the language of the
other’s. The speed and accuracy of scientific research should
improve.
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